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Mark Blyth is a political economist who is at the forefront of 
studies on the role of ideas and uncertainty in politics. He is 
particularly interested in the recent turn to ideas and 
constructivist theory in various fields of political science. In his 
talk at the Mershon Center , he focused on economics and the 
subfield of international political economy and explored the 
possibilities and promises of utilizing a constructivist approach in 
them.  
Blyth began his talk by noting two important observations about 
the state of the scholarship on international political economy. He 
first argued that there is a discernible shift to constructivism that 
can potentially tell us a lot about the way political scientists 
undertake research. He noted that most theories in the discipline 
tend not very successful in making predictions. The End of the 
Cold War and World War II are two of the most prominent 
examples scholars of political science failed to foresee. Similarly, 
big debates in the discipline tend to disappear almost as rapidly 
as they arise. Blyth believes these events illustrate a 
fundamental problem with the underlying concepts and 
assumptions of most current analyses in political science and 
international relations.  
Blyth said that constructivist theory, on the other hand, offers a 
different viewpoint to the social world. It differs because 
constructivists tend to place more emphasis on ideas and 
uncertainty in place of materialistic and fixed concepts. Blyth 
argued that interests and meanings are best viewed as 
constructed by agents and not objectively-based or “given.” A 
second central premise of constructivism is that the world is 
better analyzed in terms of dynamics rather than comparative 
statics.  
There is a further problem with mainstream approaches, Blyth 
said. Given the inherent endogenous complexity of the social 
world we live in, researchers cannot reliably control for the 
changes that occur in one component, and in turn, they cannot 
be certain what may cause change in another. The world is also 
full of uncertainty, not merely risk, which makes post-hoc 
assessment of agents' strategies inherently problematic for 
analysts. This uncertain character of social, economic and 
political surroundings mean we can only talk in terms of 
unpredictability and contingency, he said. Realizing this as 
researchers will enable us to accept that stability and institutions 
designed to achieve it do so in the face of constant change and 
uncertain. They are themselves social constructions. Institutions 
and rules that help us order and navigate the world, are 
therefore, never static, but subject to tension and contestation, 
nor are they perfect in their design or wholly predictable in their 
implications, said Blyth.  
Being aware of the constructed nature of meaning, stability, and 
social institutions also has an interesting implication for the 
dominant mode of thinking in political science and economics 
today. Material rationality, which posits actors to be rational, 
self-maximizers with given, objective interests, is best construed 
as a special case in social scientific analyses rather than a 
general one when approached from Blyth's perspective.  
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He argued that one has to distinguish between different 
phenomena in terms of the degree of uncertainty inherent in an 
environment. Mathematics can be a powerful tool for analysis in 
certain research areas in social science. Legislatures with clear 
actors and determined preferences are one example, where 
game theory is indeed helpful. But math is ultimately a language 
and not a technology that applies equally well to all areas. 
Particularly if one accepts the view that the world is one of 
uncertainty and indeterminacy, it becomes very difficult to utilize 
uniform distributions and probabilities as sound representations 
of the things we analyze in politics or economics as a-priori 
assumptions.  
The social world we live in and analyze as scholars is ultimately a 
case of too many variables and not many outcomes. Its inherent 
instability and unpredictability means that we are more surprised 
by what we see in our observations, and eschew analyses with 
high levels of generality and determinacy. Given this, we should 
not necessarily think more data is better, as going farther back in 
time to include more cases may force us into rigid pictures and 
away from the actual one where most of the information is to be 
found in the ‘outlier' case, suggested Blyth.  
A basic problem we face in social science is that too many 
variables are attached to any one phenomenon and many 
different stories can be and are in fact told about it. And perhaps 
more importantly, what may be formulated as causes at one 
period in time are not likely to be causes in another period. This 
is because any given equilibrium point in the social world which 
we take as our datum is subject to constant change. Our results, 
however determinate we may hold them to be, may not be 
projected into the future with as much confidence as we expect 
from our standard models that assume ergodicity and that there 
is a ‘real' mean to sample for. This is because the stability and 
meanings we observe are constructed and mediated by agents, 
which is done so differently in different periods. The very action 
of moving towards an equilibrium displaces the equilibrium itself. 
Ideas, norms, and conventions agents have or employ therefore 
matter more than social scientists usually think them to do in 
terms of giving the appearance of ‘structure' and the resources 
for change.  
Finally, Blyth argued it was also important to keep in mind that 
unlike in natural sciences, complete independence of subject and 
object does not apply in social science. As a researcher one must 
realize that the agents one studies are implicated in the thing 
s/he samples and studies, and are not separate from it. In the 
social world, agents' beliefs cause things to happen. If actors 
happen to believe X will happen, they will undertake actions to 
make something happen, as is evidenced in dynamics of financial 
crises, for instance. This is why it is important to note the 
significant role of ideas and norms. Following this line of this 
argument, we are also reminded that social phenomena such as 
the institutions we treat as objective are not given by the 
system; rather, they are estimates and constructions, i.e. ideas, 
realized in human or material form.  
Constructivists are often accused of being nihilists with an anti-
scientific orientation who aim to undermine the very idea of 
science. But Mark Blyth believes that constructivism is in fact the 
theory that holds the best promise to salvage social science itself 
because it forces us to rethink our conceptions, note the 
limitations in our analysis, and work towards a perhaps more 
humble and less generalizing, but nonetheless a sounder social 
science. This is not to claim that actors are non-rational or 
everything is relative. Rather, by positing the constructed nature 
of stability or rationality, the constructivist perspective argues 
that these are to be explained, not taken for granted.  
And secondly, it may be more fruitful to approach the 
unexplained error terms in our analyses as something to be 
analyzed. In fact, they may contain the most crucial and 
interesting portion of the explanation as they are likely to 
surprise the analyst and reader alike. In sum, the world may be 
more random and contingent than the way social scientists often 
think. Admitting this will help us as scholars to formulate more 
durable and sounder theories in social science.  
Mark Blyth is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the 
Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. His research interests lie 
in the areas of Comparative Political Economy, the Politics of 
Ideas, and the Politics of Uncertainty. He has been a visiting 
professor in the UK, France, Germany and Singapore. He is the 
author of Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and 
Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2002) and is currently working on 
three projects. The first is a book on party politics and political 
economy in advanced welfare states called “The New Political 
Economy of Party Politics.” The second is an edited volume on 
constuctivist theory and political economy entitled “Constructivst 
Political Economy.” The third project is a series of papers on 
probability, randomness, and epistemology in the social sciences 
which may or may not end up a book. His most recent articles 
have appeared in Comparative Politics, World Politics, 
Perspectives on Politics, and Western European Politics.  
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